Has China’s anti-corruption campaign brought down a “New Gang of Four”, and what could that imply about the country’s leadership? – Part 1: It’s four power leftists’ corruptions

(This article is expanded from a January 13, 2015 posting on my Facebook community page, History, Culture and Politics.)

In 2012-2013 when former Chinese Communist Party Politburo member Bo Xilai was expelled from the party, criminally tried and sentenced to life in prison for “bribery, embezzlement and abuse of power” following his wife’s trial and suspended death sentence for murder, I covered their cases extensively on postings on the Facebook page, History, Culture and Politics.

(Facebook posting, September 30, 2013, History, Culture and Politics)

I noted that Bo was only the 3rd Politburo member to fall from grace since the 1989 Chinese military suppression of pro-democracy protests on Capital Beijing’s Tiananmen Square, and that prior to his downfall Bo had led the most maverick high-profile political campaign, a Maoist-style one, in China since 1989:

“Suspension of Bo Xilai from the Chinese Communist Party Politburo and arrest of his wife as a murder suspect in the death of British businessman Neil Heywood signalled the end of the most maverick high-level political campaign in China since the 1989 Tiananmen Square pro-democracy protests when then Party leader Zhao Ziyang took a stand more sympathetic to the protesters than the Party establishment, and fell from power.

Bo is the third Politburo member to fall from grace after the military suppression of the 1989 protests. The previous two were Beijing City Party leader Chen Xitong in 1995, who had been one of the hardline leaders supporting the military crackdown, and Shanghai City Party leader Chen Liangyu in 2005, all on corruption charges.

Unlike the Chen’s, Bo, “princeling” son of a Communist revolutionary / behind-the-scenes elder of the 1989 crackdown, has been a Maoist-style populist campaigning directly to the people.”

(Facebook posting, April 11, 2012, History, Culture and Politics)

I also noted a unique international dimension of the Bo Xilai scandal, namely that it was triggered by British businessman Neil Heywood’s murder later admitted to by Bo’s wife Gu Kailai, and that Bo maintained a degree of popularity in the city of Chongqing where he was the party chief until his fall, because of his campaign against organized crime, efforts on building affordable housing, and promotion of Maoist songs and mass gatherings:

“The scandal surrounding Bo, Congqing city party leader when it unraveled, involved his wife Gu Kailai’s murder of British businessman Neil Heywood, and city police chief Wang Lijun’s seeking asylum from the U.S. Consulate in nearby city of Chengdu, who exposed the Bo family secrets.

Bo was a leftwing populist, and is still popular in the regions where he served, especially in Chongqing he led from 2007 to 2012. Bo campaigned against organized crime, built affordable housing, and promoted Maoist songs and mass gatherings as a way of building his popularity among the city’s 30 million residents.”

(September 30, 2013, History, Culture and Politics)

In March 2012 just as Bo Xilai was about to fall from grace, a Ferrari car crash in Beijing killed the young male driver and seriously injured his two young female passengers, sending rumors swirling that the dead man was the son of senior party official Ling Jihua, director of the Communist Party Central Committee’s General Office and a top political lieutenant of the party leader, then Chinese President Hu Jintao. The two young women were reported to be of ethnic minority origins, possibly Tibetan.

The timing of these events, that involving Bo and that rumored to involve Ling, was sensitive. A scheduled, once in a decade, party-and-government leadership change was about to take place in late 2012 – early 2013, and it was believed by some political watchers that Ling’s attempted cover-up of his son’s death cost him a promotion, by the outgoing leader Hu, to the Politburo. One sensitive question was:

“How had the son of a Communist Party official, whose salary is relatively meager, managed to acquire a Ferrari?”

(“How a Ferrari Crash May Have Unsettled China’s Leadership Transition”, Hannah Beech, September 4, 2012, Time)

But some experts on Chinese politics saw in these events political factional infighting within the Communist Party.

Brookings Institution analyst Cheng Li viewed the ruling party as broadly divided between two informal coalitions, the “elitist” and the “populist”:

“Li argues the core elitist faction is the “taizidang,” or so-called “princelings” — the offspring of former revolutionary leaders and high-ranking officials. Another elite, albeit fading, faction is the so-called “Shanghai Gang,” or followers of Jiang Zemin, who served as mayor of Shanghai before becoming China’s supreme leader in 1989.”

(“‘One Party, Two Coalitions’ – China’s Factional Politics”, Alexis Lai, updated November 8, 2012, CNN News)

Li said that in 2012 the elitist coalition was led by Wu Bangguo, outgoing chairman of the National People’s Congress (the national legislature), and Jia Qinglin, outgoing chairman of the Chinese People’s Political Consultative Conference (an advisory body consisting of delegates from various political parties and regions) – both protégés of Jiang.

According to Li, the populist coalition was dominated by former Communist Youth League officials:

“The populists are dominated by the “tuanpai” — politicians who cut their teeth in the Chinese Communist Youth League, the party’s nation-wide organization for youth aged 14-28 to study and promote communism. The league is also a training ground for party cadres.”

(Alexis Lai, updated November 8, 2012, CNN News)

Li said that in 2012 the populist coalition was led by outgoing President Hu and outgoing Premier Wen Jiabao.

Broadly speaking in this theory, the two coalitions run along socioeconomic and geographic divides, with the elitist coalition representing businesses and the affluent regions, and the populist coalition representing the poor and the less developed regions:

“The two coalitions represent different socio-economic and geographical constituencies. Most of the top leaders in the elitist coalition, for instance, are “princelings”, leaders who come from families of veteran revolutionaries or of high-ranking officials. These princelings often began their careers in the economically well-developed coastal cities. The elitist coalition usually represents the interests of China’s entrepreneurs.

Most leading figures in the populist coalition, by contrast, come from less-privileged families. They also tend to have accumulated much of their leadership experience in the less-developed inland provinces.

Many advanced in politics by way of the Chinese Communist Youth League and have therefore garnered the label tuanpai, literally meaning “league faction”. These populists often voice the concerns of vulnerable social groups, such as farmers, migrant workers and the urban poor.”

(“Viewpoint: The powerful factions among China’s rulers”, Cheng Li, November 6, 2012, BBC News)

Li reasoned that the formation of two main coalition factions is a departure from the “all-powerful strongman” rule of the Mao Zrdong era and the Deng Xiaoping era, and represents “something approximating a mechanism of checks and balances in the decision-making process”:

“In fact, two main political factions or coalitions within the CCP leadership are currently competing for power, influence and control over policy initiatives. This bifurcation has created within China’s one-party polity something approximating a mechanism of checks and balances in the decision-making process.

This mechanism, of course, is not the kind of institutionalised system of checks and balances that operates between the executive, legislative and judicial branches in a democratic system.

But this new structure – sometimes referred to in China as “one party, two coalitions” – does represent a major departure from the “all-powerful strongman” model that was characteristic of politics in the Mao and Deng eras.”

(Cheng Li, November 6, 2012, BBC News)

Bo Xilai is the son of Bo Yibo, a former Politburo member who last served as a vice chairman of the Central Advisory Commission during the Deng era. Cheng Li singled out Bo Xilai and Ling Jihua as stars of the “elitist” and “populist” factions, respectively, who took a fall or setback in 2012:

“And there is a crisis going on now – one brought on by scandals among the factional leaders.

Threats to stability

The most serious one has centred on Bo Xilai, a prominent princeling. Another case is Ling Jihua, Hu Jintao’s former chief of staff and up until recently a rising star in the tuanpai faction. Having become embroiled in a scandal of his own, Ling was appointed to a less important position on the eve of the Party Congress.

These scandals among factional leaders, however, can and should be easily dismissed. Factions themselves are too strong to be dismantled.”

(Cheng Li, November 6, 2012, BBC News)

If the emergence of the “one party, two coalitions” structure was about “balances” as Cheng Li asserted, then I wonder whether Bo’s fall and Ling’ setback in 2012 represented a balance, i.e., one “elitist” star and one “populist” star, each damaged by corruption.

But there was a stark irony in this contrast: while the elitist’s fall was connected to his wife’s shady business dealings that led to murdering a foreign businessman, the populist’s setback came with the loss of his son to a flashy lifestyle – if the Ferrari crash rumor was true.

Ling Jihua’s corruption was real as over 2 years later in December 2014 the Communist Party leadership announced that he was being investigated for “discipline violations”:

“He was, in effect, presidential chief of staff to Mr Xi’s predecessor, Hu Jintao – the gatekeeper at the very heart of power for a decade.

Ling Jihua’s problems began more than two years ago when rumours began to swirl about an alleged cover-up over his son, who died while driving his Ferrari alongside two semi-clad young women.

Over recent months the net has been closing in on the entire Ling family as corruption investigations were announced into one brother after another.”

(“Ling Jihua: China investigates top aide to former president”, December 22, 2014, BBC News)

But what about Bo Xilai’s Maoist-style populism that made him better known in China individually than most of his peers? Didn’t that make him a “populist”, and the downfalls of two populist stars?

Cheng Li categorized Bo as a “princeling” elitist making appeal with a populist – Maoist – approach across the factional lines:

“Some politicians have sought to round out their resumes with credentials across geographic and socioeconomic lines. Bo famously adopted a populist approach invoking Mao nostalgia during his tenure as party secretary of Chongqing, while Xi Jinping — widely expected to become China’s next president — left a prestigious post in Beijing to work in rural Hebei for three years.”

(Alexis Lai, November 8, 2012, CNN News)

I suppose a politician of greater ambition would try to make broader appeals beyond his established political base, and so if Bo had, it is not surprising that Xi Jinping, in 2012 the expected next leader of China, as a “princeling” elitist also had cultivated a populist image – through working in the rural area for a time.

But there was a huge difference between Bo Xilai and Xi Jinping in the political meanings of the word “populist”, in “invoking Mao nostalgia” versus “to work in rural Hebei”. One was deploying Maoist politics, while the other displaying an affinity with people at the grassroots.

Given that both were “princelings” and the identification is important in Chinese politics, the respective stories of their fathers may have relevance.

When Bo Xilai’s father Bo Yibo, a noted Communist revolutionary, died in 2007, The New York Times’ obituary included the following descriptions of him:

“Bo Yibo, the last of the Eight Immortals, Communist Party leaders who steered China through a politically volatile shift from Maoism to today’s market-oriented economic boom, died Monday. He was 98.

…

As one of the elderly but immensely influential party veterans who hovered above the country’s appointed leadership in the 1980s and 90s, Mr. Bo helped Deng Xiaoping, the paramount leader who died in 1997, overcome elite opposition to capitalist-style economic reforms.

Also like Deng, Mr. Bo had little tolerance for political liberalization. He played an important role in purging Hu Yaobang, a popular party leader who favored faster political change, in 1987. Mr. Bo also defended the army crackdown on pro-democracy protesters in Beijing in 1989, which left hundreds of people dead.

The Eight Immortals were an informal group of senior Communist Party leaders who were purged during Mao’s Cultural Revolution but experienced a second political life after Mr. Deng’s return to power in 1978.”

(“Bo Yibo, Leader Who Helped Reshape Chinese Economy, Dies at 98”, Joseph Khan, January 17, 2007, The New York Times)

As described, Bo Xilai’s father was one of the overlords around strongman paramount leader Deng Xiaoping in the 1980s and 1990s, exercising power from above the official leadership, having previously suffered during the Cultural Revolution under the strongman leader Mao Zedong; and he defended the military suppression of pro-democracy protests in 1989.

So the son’s invoking Maoist politics, with a twisted irony perhaps, might really be about exercising power.

Xi Jinping’s father Xi Zhongxun, who died a few years before Bo’s father, was a little lesser known, and in early 2012 when the son was set to become the next Chinese leader, the following was in The Washington Post’s descriptions of the father:

“A brief, official biography issued by Xinhua News Agency makes no mention of Xi’s illustrious father, who commanded communist guerrillas in northwest China, rose to the rank of deputy prime minister after the 1949 revolution, got ousted by Mao Zedong in 1962 and, after 16 years in disgrace, reemerged to pioneer some of China’s boldest economic reforms. …

…

But the details of the elder Xi’s tumultuous career — his rupture with Mao, his close ties to other purge targets who are still on the party’s blacklist, and his defiance of rigid orthodoxy — are increasingly sensitive topics in a one-party state where history is shaped to serve the present.

…

… Although respected by crusty conservatives and neo-Maoist firebrands, Xi senior is particularly popular with many liberals, who remember him as unusually open-minded and tolerant — and hope that his son, under a carapace of political rectitude, is perhaps similar.

…

While in charge of a vast swath of northwestern China in the early 1950s, the elder Xi resisted pressure from some colleagues to crush an early uprising by Tibetans and insisted on negotiating. When Deng Xiaoping ordered tanks into Tiananmen Square to clear protesters in 1989, Xi said nothing publicly but is widely thought to have been appalled. (His official biographer declined to comment on that).”

(“For China’s next leader, the past is sensitive”, Andrew Higgins, February 13, 2012, The Washington Post)

As described, Xi Jinping’s father had been more independently minded under Mao Zedong, fallen out of favor earlier and suffered longer than Bo’s father; then under Deng Xiaoping, Xi’s father was involved in economic reforms like Bo’s father, but more as a “pioneer” than as an ‘overlord’, and when the military suppression of pro-democracy protests happened in 1989 he remained silent, unlike Bo’s father who defended it.

Like fathers, like sons, perhaps? At the least, it could be an explanation why Bo Xilai the “princeling” son resorted to a Maoist-style political campaign whereas Xi Jinping the “princeling” son had chosen a “common touch” approach.

If so, then not only that the fall of Bo Xilai and the setback of Ling Jihua represented a balance between the elitist and the populist coalitions in 2012, but that the fall of Bo Xilai and the rise of Xi Jinping must have indicated something about the “princeling” elitist faction itself.

In 2012 anticipating a huge power shift toward the elitist coalition, the China analyst Cheng Li was critical of the once-in-a-decade leadership change.

Prior to the leadership change, Li lauded the merits of the relatively even split of seats on the outgoing all-powerful Politburo Standing Committee, expressing concern over any shift of balance in favor of the elitist coalition:

“The nine-member PSC, for example, has – at least prior to this 2012 Party Congress – maintained a four-to-five split, with four seats for the populist coalition and five going to the elitist coalition.

…

Paradoxically, it is also in the interest of both factions to have the existing balance of power remain intact (a three-to-four split assuming the new committee will consist of seven members). The overall balance of power should also take into consideration the composition of the full Politburo and the Central Military Commission, including whether or not Hu Jintao steps down as the chairman of the powerful military commission at the Party Congress.

But recent rumours hold that the factional split in the new standing committee will shift to two-to-five (two tuanpai versus five princelings or protégés of Jiang). If true, this could be highly problematic. If the factional balance is not maintained, the defeated faction would likely use its political resources and socio-economic constituencies to undermine the legitimacy of the political system, which in turn would threaten the stability of the country at large.”

(Cheng Li, November 6, 2012, BBC News)

In short, as the Politburo Standing Committee was being downsized from 9 to 7, Cheng Li would like to see the power balance maintained at a ratio of elitist 4 versus populist 3, similar to the outgoing elitist 5 versus populist 4, and not the rumored change to elitist 5 versus populist 2, which in his opinion could risk China’s stability due to socio-economic problems.

When the new leadership emerged Li found it a shock, seeing a near total win for the elitists over the populists in a 6:1 ratio of the “supreme decision-making body”:

“Prior to the announcement of the composition of the new guard, led by new party General Secretary Xi Jinping, many analysts both in China and abroad had believed that the new leadership would continue to maintain the roughly equal balance of power that existed between the Jiang Zemin camp and the Hu Jintao camp. Yet in the end, the results were a huge surprise: the Jiang camp won a landslide victory by obtaining six out of the seven seats on the Politburo Standing Committee (PSC) while only one leader in the Hu camp—Li Keqiang, now designated to become premier in March—was able to keep a seat on this supreme decision-making body.

…

Chinese politics thus seem to be entering a new era characterized by the concentration of princeling power at the top.”

(“Rule of the Princelings”, Cheng Li, February 10, 2013, The Cairo Review of Global Affairs, Brookings Institution)

Cheng Li saw two major problems with this new leadership, namely, no expansion of “intra-party democracy” others had hoped to see “in the wake of the recent Bo Xilai scandal”, and too many “princelings” on the PSC:

“In the wake of the recent Bo Xilai scandal and the resulting crisis of CPC rule, many had anticipated that party leaders would adopt certain election mechanisms—what the Chinese authorities call “intra-party democracy”—to restore the party’s much-damaged legitimacy and to generate a sense that the new top leaders do indeed have an election-based new mandate to rule. For example, some analysts had anticipated that the CPC Central Committee might use competitive (though limited) multiple-candidate elections to select members of its leadership bodies, such as the twenty-five-member politburo or even the PSC. Such high-level elections, however, did not take place. The selection of elites at this congress continued to be done the old fashioned way—through the “black box” of manipulation, deal-cutting, and trade-offs that occur behind the scenes among a handful of politicians (e.g., outgoing PSC members and retired heavyweight figures—most noticeably the 86-year old Jiang).

What is even more troubling is the fact that four out of the seven PSC members are princelings—leaders who come from families of either veteran revolutionaries or high-ranking officials. It has been widely noted that large numbers of prominent party leaders and families have used their political power to convert state assets into their own private wealth. The unprecedentedly strong presence of princelings in the new PSC is likely to reinforce public resentment of how power and wealth continue to converge in China.”

(Cheng Li, February 10, 2013, The Cairo Review of Global Affairs, Brookings Institution)

In other words, Li saw the fall of Bo Xilai as that of a “princeling” elitist star, and a lesson for the Communist Party not to concentrate power further into the elitist coalition, but to take a more populist route, to make the party internal election mechanism more egalitarian and real.

But I can see something quite different: Bo Xilai wasn’t just any “princeling” elitist but one with a Maoist populist tendency; and so the denunciation of him could already be a step away from political dictatorialism, while rendering the new elitist coalition purer – provided the elitists can rely on the “common touch” populism of its new leader, the incoming Chinese leader Xi Jinping.

In 2012 Cheng Li did mention the rumor that both the disgraced elitist Bo Xilai and the demoted populist Ling Jihua had ties to the retiring domestic security tsar, outgoing Politburo Standing Committee member Zhou Yongkang. But Li did not mention the fact that the downsized new PSC no longer reserved a seat for domestic security supervision. That change was potentially significant, as subsequently in 2013 Zhou also came under suspicion of corruption:

“China’s former domestic security chief Zhou Yongkang, one of the country’s most powerful politicians of the last decade, is helping authorities in a corruption probe and, contrary to media reports, is not currently the target of the investigation, sources told Reuters.

The investigation could take weeks, maybe months, to complete. Even if Zhou is implicated, he is unlikely to follow in the footsteps of disgraced ally Bo Xilai and face prosecution, said the sources, who have ties to the leadership or direct knowledge of the matter.

…

When Zhou stepped down along with most members of the Standing Committee at the 18th Party congress last November, the role of domestic security tsar was downgraded, reflecting leadership fears that the position had become too powerful.”

(“China’s ex-security chief helping probe, not target: sources”, Benjamin Kang Lim and Ben Blanchard, September 4, 2013, Yahoo News)

I can also see the 2012 downgrade of the Communist Party leadership’s top position overseeing law and order as another step away from political dictatorialism, in line with the denunciation of Bo Xilai and the subsequent criminal prosecution of him for abuse of power.

But most importantly, in 2012 Bo Xilai’s downfall and Ling Jihua’s setback had more to do with corruption, as did the suspicion in 2013 about former security tsar Zhou Yongkang. Cheng li was probably right pointing out that “large numbers of prominent party leaders and families have used their political power to convert state assets into their own private wealth”, and so high-level leadership change in their favor might “reinforce public resentment of how power and wealth continue to converge in China”.

Fighting corruption is thus an important mechanism to placate public resentment over wealth accumulation among the politically powerful.

In 2012 the incoming Politburo Standing Committee gave a seat to Wang Qishan, a protégé of former Premier Zhu Rongji, both well known for economic and management abilities, and China watchers hoped that Wang would be tasked with fixing the economy and pushing for more economic reform:

“China’s Politburo Standing Committee operates in much the same way that a board of directors with specific portfolios assigned to each member does. … Their individual portfolios are important, however, because that determines which issues each member will have the most authority over for routine policymaking.

…

…The cadre most likely to receive one of those seats is Wang Qishan, the current vice premier in charge of financial affairs. The big question is which portfolio he will get.

That is a delicate question in Beijing. Some had considered Wang Qishan to be a better fit for the premier slot than Li Keqiang. The premier manages China’s economy, and Wang Qishan boasts significant economic experience. He is also considered to be a competent and reliable fixer—so much so that he has been nicknamed the “firefighter.” Chinese leaders have called on Wang Qishan to reform provincial governments in Hainan and Guangdong, to repair China’s image after the SARS crisis, and to manage Beijing’s 2008 Olympics debut. He succeeded in every task.

Wang also happens to be a protégé of former Premier Zhu Rongji, the economic and finance czar who cleaned up China’s banking system in the 1990s and ushered the country into the World Trade Organization. Overall, Wang is widely seen as a competent fixer with serious economic chops—and China is definitely in need of economic fixing.

…

Zhu Rongji was certainly effective in that regard, and many who look at Wang are reminded of his mentor. Given China’s current economic problems, many observers are hoping that Wang Qishan will receive a similar role and use that position to once again push for serious economic reform.”

(“Beijing to Announce New Leaders and Their Portfolios”, Melanie Hart, November 2, 2012, Center for American Progress)

But instead of overseeing the economy, Wang Qishan was given the role of primarily leading the fight against corruption within the ranks of the Communist Party:

“After the transition of power at China’s 18th Party Congress, the country’s leaders have voiced their determination to fight corruption with a stringency rarely seen in the past. On November 17, President Xi Jinping said that corruption, if left uncontrolled, would ruin the Communist Party and the nation. His voice was echoed by Wang Qishan, also a member of the Politburo Standing Committee and the secretary of the Commission for Discipline Inspection of the Central Committee of the Party, during a symposium two weeks later. The symposium had gathered eight scholars of political science, law,and economics to give advice on fighting corruption.

The torrent of anti-corruption rhetoric seems also to be unfolding in practice. In recent weeks, more than ten public officials have been dismissed and investigated. …

Yet a large portion of Web users feel that the string of cases look more like arbitrary political moves than reliable institutional proceedings. …”

(“China’s War on Corruption Is About to Get Real”, Yueran Zhang, December 11, 2012, The Atlantic)

As the above quote indicates, the importance and urgency of fighting corruption was reflected by the new Chinese leader Xi Jinping’s statement, that if left uncontrolled corruption would ruin the Communist Party and the country, and also by the assignment of new Politburo Standing Committee member Wang Qishan – the “firefighter” – to “Discipline Inspection”.

In 2014 under the leadership of President Xi Jinping and the supervision of Wang Qishan, the anti-official corruption campaign expanded, intensified and caught two retired top Communist Party officials more senior than Bo Xilai and Ling Jihua, expelling them from the party and sending their cases for criminal prosecution.

In June, it was People’s Liberation Army General Xu Caihou, former vice chairman of the party’s Central Military Commission and former Politburo member, “the most prominent Chinese military leader to be purged in decades”:

“Until his retirement in late 2012, General Xu held one of the highest ranks in the People’s Liberation Army, as a vice chairman of the party’s Central Military Commission. He was also a member of the elite Politburo. He has become the most prominent Chinese military leader to be purged in decades, and the most senior official named publicly in Mr. Xi’s campaign to clean up the elite and impose his authority on the party, government and army.”

(“China’s Antigraft Push Snares an Ex-General”, by Chris Buckley, June 30, 2014, The New York Times)

Then in December, it was retired security tsar Zhou Yongkang – suspected of corruption since 2013 – who, being a former member of the all-powerful Politburo Standing Committee, became “the most senior member of the Communist Party to be investigated since the infamous Gang of Four – a faction that included the widow of founding leader Mao Zedong – were put on trial in 1980”:

“Mr Zhou – who retired from China’s all-powerful Politburo Standing Committee in 2012 – “leaked the party’s and the country’s secrets,” Xinhua said, adding that the once-influential official was found to have “accepted a large amount of money and properties personally and through his family”.

The announcement makes Mr Zhou the most senior member of the Communist Party to be investigated since the infamous Gang of Four – a faction that included the widow of founding leader Mao Zedong – were put on trial in 1980.”

(“China arrests former security chief Zhou Yongkang”, December 5, 2014, The Telegraph)

It was after these two bigger ex-officials’ downfalls had become public that in late December 2014 the Communist Party leadership announced the investigation of Ling Jihua – the rumored father of a dead Ferrari driver, missing an anticipated 2012 promotion to the Politburo – for “suspected serious discipline violations”:

“Xinhua, the state-run news agency, announced in a terse statement on Monday night that the official, Ling Jihua, was being investigated for “suspected serious discipline violations,” the standard euphemism for allegations of corruption and abuses of power. It gave no details.

Until his abrupt loss of influence in September 2012, Mr. Ling, 58, was a trusted aide to Mr. Hu, comparable to a White House chief of staff, and had been widely considered a candidate for promotion to the Politburo.

…

The investigation into Mr. Ling opens another chapter in a palace intrigue that began with a car crash two years ago that killed Mr. Ling’s 23-year-old son, Ling Gu, and critically injured two young women riding in the Ferrari he was driving on a Beijing ring road.”

(“Party Opens an Inquiry Into a Onetime Aide to China’s Ex-Leader”, by Andrew Jacobs, Chris Buckley and Michael Forsythe, December 22, 2014, The New York Times)

That made it a total of 4 former top-level Communist Party officials disgraced by and prosecuted for corruption, with their seniority reaching the highest level since the infamous “Gang of Four” of the Mao Zedong era were put on trial in 1980.

With such a reminder, even Communist Party cadres began to dub these four the “New Gang of Four”:

“Chinese President Xi Jinping’s decision to investigate his predecessor’s top aide for corruption marks the downfall of the remaining “tiger” in a group that Communist Party cadres termed the “New Gang of Four.”

…

Gu Su, a law professor at Nanjing University, said the “New Gang of Four” term is popularly used by party members to describe the loose grouping, even though the extent of ties between them aren’t clear. The name is borrowed from the infamous gang, including Mao’s wife, who held immense power in the Cultural Revolution.

Uprooted Gang

The state-owned Global Times Dec. 6 described the case of Zhou alone as the “biggest, gravest since the Chinese Communist Party uprooted the Gang of Four.”

“The so-called New Gang of Four represented a very strong political group that covered every aspect of power from military to the party,” said Zhang Lifan, a Beijing-based historian who previously worked at the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences. They could have posed a challenge to the current leadership’s hold to power and claim to legitimacy if left unchecked, Zhang said.”

(“Xi Dismantles the ‘New Gang of Four’ With Probe of Hu’s Aide”, December 23, 2014, Bloomberg.com)

At least the case of Zhou Yongkang was the “gravest” since the Communist Party’s removal of the “Gang of Four”, according to the official media.

That kind of wording, and the Beijing-based scholar Zhang Lifan’s comment that “they could have posed a challenge to the current leadership’s hold to power and claim to legitimacy”, strongly suggest power politics, besides corruption, as a serious component of Zhou’s case as well as the cases of the other three.

But as law scholar Gu Su pointed out, it was unclear if these four had been a linked group and hence justified to be lumped together as a “gang”. The official accusations have focused on the misdeeds of each, centered at corruption. Zhang Lifan’s claim, “The so-called New Gang of Four represented a very strong political group that covered every aspect of power from military to the party”, remains to be substantiated.

After the four’s fall, in early 2015 the Chinese official media used the term “gang” to refer to groups of lesser officials around these top figures, including the Secretary Gang, the Petroleum Gang, and the Shanxi Gang:

“Over the weekend, the Party-run Xinhua news agency even went as far as naming three of the cliques as well as some of the senior officials it said were connected to them.

“The Secretary Gang,” it said, was a group of aides to senior officials, including some of the former personal secretaries of Zhou Yongkang, the once supreme head of China’s domestic security apparatus and now himself under criminal investigation.

“The Petroleum Gang,” were bureaucrats in China’s oil industry, a sector also intimately linked to Zhou’s patronage and political control.

And finally, “The Shanxi Gang,” the newspaper claimed, were officials from the coal rich province, some of whom were linked to Ling Jihua.

Mr Ling is a native of Shanxi who, as a chief aide to the former President Hu Jintao, is another high profile political scalp to have been taken down in President Xi’s purges.

…

It said a meeting, headed by President Xi, had determined that: “Organising cliques within the party to run personal businesses is absolutely not tolerated.””

(“Why China’s Ruling Party is Bearing Down on ‘Cliques’”, by John Sudworth, January 5, 2015, China Blog, BBC News)

These “gangs” around some of the disgraced four are singled out for their being corruption groups.

Given that confirmed information about high-level Chinese politics usually only comes from the official media controlled by the Chinese government and the Communist Party, without further disclosures, some likely during the upcoming criminal trials, vailidty of the “New Gang of Four” notion would need to rely on other forms of political analysis.

For these four figures to be viewed as a political group, they should have been in collaborative activity in politics. Thus a basic question is: Did these four even share any common political objective, or outlook, at all?

If the China analyst Cheng Li was right in his theory of the populist coalition versus the elitist coalition as characterizing high-level Chinese politics, one would guess that, given the status of the new Chinese leader Xi Jinping as the leader of the elitist coalition, and given the historian Zhang Lifan’s claim that the four could have posed “a challenge to the current leadership’s hold to power and claim to legitimacy”, these disgraced former top officials were part of the populist coalition.

As discussed, former President Hu Jintao’s top political lieutenant Ling Jihua  was a member and a star of the populist coalition dominated by the “League faction”, persons whose careers had gone through the Communist Youth League. Also as discussed, Bo Xilai was a “princeling” elitist making Maoist-style populist appeal.

So Cheng Li’s theory could apply to these two, relating to Ling’s populist status, and to Bo’s populist ambition despite his elitist status.

But a limitation of Cheng Li’s theory becomes apparent when one considers the other two of the four.

Neither Xu Caihou, the former top leader of the military, nor Zhou Yongkang, the former overseer of police and security, was from an influential or prestigious social background to be viewed an elitist, and yet they were not, and in fact could not have been, populists given their positions of holding and wielding power at the top of vast government apparatuses used to deter or restrain the population from becoming restless.

Rather, their political roles had more to do with upholding the Communist political system and ideology, and enforcing adherence and compliance to the system and to the rule of the state within the system’s framework, as can be seen in not only their former top positions but also their career backgrounds.

Starting his career in the People’s Liberation Army in 1963 when he was admitted to study Electronics Engineering at Harbin Institute of Military Engineering, Xu Caihou became a solder after military university graduation in 1968, in 1971 became an army officer when he was appointed a “deputy political instructor”, and a year later was given a serious political post as “secretary and deputy chief of the Personnel Division of the Political Department of the Jilin Military Area Command”. After 10 years on that job, Xu began to rise steadily through the ranks on the political supervision side, and in 1985 became the top political officer of the 16th Group Army, and in 1992 the director of the Liberation Army Daily, the Chinese military’s official newspaper:

“1985-1990: Director of the Political Department of the 16th Group Army of the Ground Force.

1990-1992: Political Commissar of the 16th Group Army of the Ground Force.

1992-1993: Assistant director of the PLA General Political Department, assistant director of the Department and concurrently director of the Liberation Army Daily.

1993-1994: Deputy director of the PLA General Political Department and concurrently director of the Liberation Army Daily.”

(“Who’s Who in China’s Leadership: Xu Caihou”, China.org.cn)

In 1996, Xu became Political Commissar of the Ji’nan Military Area Command, i.e., the political leader at one of the 7 multi-provincial military commands that together cover the entire China, at a level just below the central military organs. In 1999 Xu became a member of the Central Military Commission, and in 2002 the military’s top political officer as the director of the PLA General Political Department, before his elevation in 2004-2005 to be one of the few overall military leaders as a vice chairman of the Central Military Commission, and in 2007 also a Politburo member:

“1999-2000: Member of the CPC Central Military Commission, member of the Central Military Commission of the People’s Republic of China, executive deputy director of the PLA General Political Department, and deputy secretary of its Party Committee.

2000-2002: … and concurrently secretary of the Discipline Inspection Committee of the CPC Central Military Commission …

2002-2004: Member of the Secretariat of the CPC Central Committee, member of the CPC Central Military Commission, member of the Central Military Commission of the People’s Republic of China, and director of the PLA General Political Department and secretary of its Party Committee.

2004-2005: Member of the Secretariat of the CPC Central Committee, Vice chairman of the CPC Central Military Commission and member of the Central Military Commission of the People’s Republic of China.

2005-2007: Member of the Secretariat of the CPC Central Committee, Vice chairman of the CPC Central Military Commission, and Vice chairman of the Central Military Commission of the People’s Republic of China.

2007- Member of the Political Bureau of the CPC Central Committee (till November, 2012)…”

(“… Xu Caihou”, China.org.cn)

Clearly, despite his initial military engineering education, General Xu’s entire career advancement to the very top of the Chinese military came along a political, rather than technical or warfare, track.

As for Zhou Yongkang, the most senior of the four, the criminal charges he faces include “bribery, abuse of power and leaking state secrets”, at least the last of which suggests that politics besides corruption is likely a part of his case.

Starting his career as a technician, Zhou worked in China’s state owned oil industry for 32 years, and reached its political top in 1998 in his appointment as the Communist Party secretary of China National Petroleum Corporation. A year later, Zhou was moved to a party career track as party secretary of Sichuan province. In 2002, Zhou became a member of the Politburo and the Chinese government’s minister of public security, and in 2007 was further elevated to the Politburo Standing Committee to be the overseer of law and order in the country.

(“Profile: China’s fallen security chief Zhou Yongkang”, by Yuwen Wu, April 3, 2015, BBC News)

In the Communist Party-ruled China, law and order at the top level is closely related to politics as can be seen in the name of the party central organ Zhou headed as a PSC member:

“Zhou Yongkang is secretary of the Politics and Law Commission. That makes him China’s domestic security chief. He heads China’s police and paramilitary operations and has a massive budget for maintaining law and order (which includes preventing and suppressing mass protests).”

(Melanie Hart, November 2, 2012, Center for American Progress)

In a political governing system in which career advancement was primarily through the hierarchy, and which valued political loyalty the most, it is possible for persons with influential family backgrounds and/or connections to rise to the top when such backgrounds and connections are important facets of the system, but it is unlikely that the rest of the top positions would go to “populists” i.e., those with appeals to the ordinary people, given that the vast apparatuses on which the system and the country depend would want their own top-level representations – this may be a major limitation of Cheng Li’s theory of populist coalition versus elitist coalition as characterizing high-level Chinese politics.

In the case of the four as a possible “New Gang of Four”, the facts that the two representing government apparatuses, Xu Caihou and Zhou Yongkang, were elevated for political indoctrination or enforcement substantiate them as power leftists; the Maoist-style political maverick Bo Xilai can also be viewed as such, as can Ling Jihua, the top political lieutenant of then President Hu Jintao, leader of the populist coalition dominated by the Communist Youth League faction.

It is important to understand that the populist officials who have appeals to the ordinary people work entirely within the Communist ideology and the Communist Party-ruled political system, making appeal for – instead of enforcing – the same ideology and system. Whatever their deep concern for the ordinary people or their talents in solving concrete problems, they do it within the rules, the perspectives and the outlooks of the ideology and the system.

So I think it can be reasonably concluded that all these four who fell with the emergence of the present Chinese leadership have been power figures on the political left – left of the new Chinese leader Xi Jinping, who is also the new leader of the so-called elitist coalition.

Most importantly, according to the official accusations these four have all engaged in serious activities of corruption – while at the top of the political left – in leading major sectors “that covered every aspect of power from military to the party” as pointed out by historian Zhang Lifan, They thus serve as a sobering dose of reality – contrary to any perception or presumption that the political left is people oriented – whether or not Xi Jinping’s leadership considerations had any role in their downfalls.

As time goes by, slowly there has been more information disclosed, mostly from confirmed semi-official sources, inching toward a scenario that these four disgraced former top officials, who shared political perspectives as shown in my analysis, may have indeed been a sort of a political group.

Once a year, China’s national legislature, National People’s Congress, and national political consultative body, Chinese People’s Political Consultative Conference, hold their sessions around the same time. The CPPCC has traditionally been the place where the Communist Party leadership displayed its willingness to consult with, and listen to, various sectors of the society, including non-Communist political parties that abided by the rules of the system and cooperated with the Communist Party – the constitutionally enshrined “leadership” party of China.

(“Constitution of the People’s Republic of China: Preamble”, March 14, 2004, The National People’s Congress of the People’s Republic of China)

In the latest March 2015 session several CPPCC members, quoted in their names, provided useful information on the cases of the four who might have been a political group, according to the Hong Kong newspaper South China Morning Post.

First off, CPPCC’s official spokesperson confirmed that there had been a Ferrari car crash involving Ling Jihua’s son, clarifying that the incident was not the main cause of Ling’s downfall:

“Lu Xinhua, spokesman of the Chinese People’s Political Consultative Conference, became the first to publicly link a fatal crash involving a Ferrari in the capital three years ago to a one-time aide to former president Hu Jintao. Lu said that the crash, which killed the son of former rising political star Ling Jihua, was not the main cause of Ling’s downfall.

Ling, the former director of the Communist Party’s Central Committee’s General Office, was demoted to vice-chairman of the CPPCC and head of the party’s United Front Work Department in 2012, shortly after overseas media reported on the crash.”

(“Going on record on those rumours”, by Cary Huang, March 10, 2015, South China Morning Post)

There was an official rationale for CPPCC’s providing this info to the public: after his 2012 political setback Ling was made a CPPCC vice chairman.

The South China Morning Post story went on to report that a CPPCC member and former Communist Party central researcher confirmed the existence of the “New Gang of Four” group, though no detail was quoted:

“Shi Zhihong, a CPPCC member and the former deputy director of the Central Policy Research Office, confirmed overseas reports about the formation of a “New Gang of Four” faction within the party leadership, saying the four corrupt officials had long ago been put under internal investigation.”

(Cary Huang, March 10, 2015, South China Morning Post)

It implies the four had links in their corruption activities, but not necessarily as a “political gang”.

Perhaps the most intriguing and significant info – that can broaden the scope and horizon of the discourse in this article – came from two CPPCC members who were retired senior officers of the People’s Liberation Army.

One of them, Major General Yang Chunchang, told the media that former President Hu Jintao had been a “lame duck” in chairing the Central Military Commission and CMC events had been “dictated” by the fallen former CMC vice chairman Xu Caihou:

“Yang Chunchang , a retired major general and CPPCC member, said Hu Jintao was a “lame duck” in chairing the Central Military Commission. Yang said Xu had dictated events at the commission.”

(Cary Huang, March 10, 2015, South China Morning Post)

Now, that could explain a possible scenario of the “New Gang of Four”, namely that the former Chinese leader Hu Jintao was not a strong or hands-on leader, and as a result in his era several officials in top positions around him wielded the real powers and made important decisions, and they collaborated but not necessarily as a “gang”.

Note that the four in this possible “New Gang of Four” had risen to the top of their careers during the Hu era, and was disgraced just before Hu’s retirement, was retired along with Hu, or had the career rise stopped as Hu was departing. This and their being power leftists make their identification with Hu’s rule the most obvious conclusion.

With the exception of Bo Xilai, their downfalls came in the new Chinese leader Xi Jinping’s anti-corruption campaign.

Truth could hurt, couldn’t it? Or at least difficult to swallow. Hu Jintao, the Chinese leadership’s face to the world for a decade from 2002-2003 to 2012, may have just been a “lame duck”.

Yet China’s growing success and influence garnered its leader some of the highest recognitions and praises bestowed on anyone in power.

The influential Forbes magazine in 2010 named Hu Jintao “the world’s most powerful person” – beating out none other than U.S. President Barack Obama for the title – and then in 2011 “the world’s third most powerful person”:

“Hu currently holds all 3 offices required to be considered China’s Paramount Leader: Communist Party General Secretary, President and Commander in Chief. But as part of a well-orchestrated succession plan, he will gradually give up his titles over the next few years, starting with the most important one– General Secretary–next year. His presumed successor, Xi ­Jinping, will assume the ­pres­i­den­cy a year later.”

(“The World’s Most Powerful People: Hu Jintao”, 2011, Forbes)

But it may have been Hu’s underlings like this possible “New Gang of Four” who exercised the real power, if Maj. Gen. Yang Chunchang was right about Xu Caihou and it did reflect Hu’s style more generally.

So much for the real worth of a Forbes advertisement.

Is there independent evidence that can substantiate this CPPCC member’s claim?

There is something that may well be: the promotion of Xu Caihou to be a CMC vice chairman came with President Hu Jintao’s taking over as chairman in an ‘off year’.

Communist China’s supreme military leadership setup is essentially two faces of the same body: the Party’s Central Military Commission and the State’s Central Military Commission. For instance, it is quoted earlier that Xu Caihou became a vice chairman of the party’s Central Military Commission in 2004 and vice chairman of the state’s Central Military Commission in 2005. The time discrepancy in the 2 appointments is due to the fact that the party appointment was made several months ahead of the annual session of the National People’s Congress when the state appointment was made.

More generally, in the past two decades China’s top leadership power holding and transition have settled into a rigidly smooth sort of ‘ideal’, in practice since 1992-1993 with Jiang Zemin, Hu Jintao and Xi Jinping in succession: the Communist Party’s general secretary is also the state president, with a 5-year term and serving 2 terms; a new term of the general secretary is elected by a new slate of the party congress held late in the calendar year ending with 2 or 7; the party leader is then elected the president by a new slate of the National People’s Congress, typically in March of the following year, i.e., calendar year ending with 3 or 8; in the term prior to becoming the new leader, the future successor serves as a Politburo Standing Committee member and vice president.

(“Who’s Who in China’s Leadership: Jiang Zemin”, “Who’s Who in China’s Leadership: Hu Jintao”, and, “Who’s Who in China’s leadership: Xi Jinping”, China.org.cn)

The military leadership title separate from those of the party and the state, what the Forbes description of Hu Jintao referred to as “Commander in Chief”, is the chairmanship of the two Central Military Commissions. The current Chinese leader Xi Jinping has been the first leader to hold the military leadership title immediately after the normal transition of the party and state leaderships.

Historically, the military leadership title possession played a key role for the 1989 military crackdown of pro-democracy protests on Capital Beijing’s Tiananmen Square. 

In the 1980s when Deng Xiaoping was the behind-the-scenes paramount leader of China, he let a younger generation of politicians, Yu Yaobang and then Zhao Zhiyang, serve as the party general secretary, and other elders, Li Xiannian and then Yang Shangkun, as the largely ceremonial state president. But Deng retained the chairmanship of the Central Military Commission to ensure Communist political stability. In 1989 when pro-democracy protests came, General Secretary Zhao Zhiyang showed sympathy and an internal division within the leadership came to the fore; Deng had control of the military and the cooperation of his fellow elder President Yang Shangkun and Premier Li Peng, and mobilized the military to crush the protests in Beijing on June 4. Also in June, Zhao was replaced by Jiang Zemin, party chief and former mayor in Shanghai who was able to end the protests there without using the military. In late 1989, Deng passed his Central Military Commission chairmanship to Jiang as well. In 1993 Jiang also replaced Yang as the president, and the transition began towards the norm of two 5-year terms of 3-title consolidated leadership as it is today. 

(“Deng, Li Seen Winning China Power Struggle”, by David Holley and Jim Mann, May 26, 1989, Los Angeles Times; “TURMOIL IN CHINA; In Shanghai, Protesters Turn Defiant”, by Richard Bernstein, June 10, 1989, The New York Times; Michel Oksenberg, Lawrence R. Sullivan and Marc Lambert, eds., Beijing Spring, 1989: Confrontation and Conflict: The Basic Documents, 1990, M. E. Sharpe; and, “Party Chief Jiang Zemin, 70, Holds Reins but Faces Tests”, by Steven Mufson, February 20, 1997, The Washington Post)

A decade after Jiang Zemin consolidated the 3 titles, the 2002 Communist Party congress and the 2003 National People’s Congress became the first time when power transfer to the next leader took place orderly and without turmoil in the background. Still, Jiang acted like Deng in the 1980s and passed only the party general secretary and state president positions to Hu Jintao, keeping the Central Military Commission chairmanship.

Then in 2004-2005, Jiang finally let Hu assume the remaining important title, and that was when Xu Caihou, the PLA general among the possible “New Gang of Four”, was elevated to vice chairman of the CMC, i.e., at the same time as President Hu Jintao’s ascension to the supreme chairmanship of the military:

“The Fourth Plenum of the 16th CCP Central Committee witnessed some important personnel moves and structural modifications to the Central Military Commission. In addition to Hu Jintao succeeding Jiang Zemin as chairman, Xu Caihou joined Guo Boxiong and Cao Gangchuan as vice chairman. General Armaments Department (GAD) Director Li Jinai moved over to replace Xu as director of the General Political Department (GPD), and in a surprising move, Jinan Military Region Commander Chen Bingde was added to the commission to replace Li Jinai as head of the GAD. …”

(“The King Is Dead! Long Live the King! The CMC Leadership Transition from Jiang to Hu”, by James Mulvenon, No. 13, China Leadership Monitor, Hoover Institution)

Within this promotion are several interesting pieces of evidence, albeit partial, showing that Xu Caihou was made one of the overall leaders of the Chinese military to help Hu Jintao run the military apparatus.

Firstly, since the Jiang Zemin era the CMC normally had two military vice chairmen, as it was prior to Xu’s promotion and as it is today, but Hu’s arrival at its helm came with the appointment of Xu as an extra-third vice chairman.

Secondly, as cited earlier, in March 2015 retired Maj. Gen. Yang Chunchang, a member of the Chinese People’s Political Consultative Conference, stated Hu Jintao had been a “lame duck” CMC chairman while Xu Caihou dictated the CMC events; quite clearly, Xu was promoted there to run the CMC under Hu.

Thirdly, that the promotion of Xu was an enforcement boost for Hu can be seen indirectly in a resulting promotion that was a boost to Xu: the PLA’s General Armaments Department director was moved laterally to fill Xu’s General Political Department directorship, and the new armaments director was promoted from the Jinan Military Region, i,e., Xu’s former regional base in the late 1990s when he was, as cited earlier, “Political Commissar of the Ji’nan Military Area Command and Secretary of its Party Committee”.

And lastly, the promotion of the PLA’s top political officer as a specially added CMC vice chairman to assist new CMC Chairman Hu Jintao had the perfect political color and symbolism for who this new Chinese leader was.

The China analyst Cheng Li pointed out, quite correctly, that then President Hu Jintao was the leader of the “populist” coalition that was dominated by the “League faction”. Quite like Xu Caihou but in a civilian setting, Hu started with an engineering education at China’s leading engineering university, Tsinghua University, then became a “political instructor” there, and subsequently spent most of his life on a Communist political career track, including serving as the head of the official Chinese youth organization, the leader of the Communist Youth League, and the Communist Party chief in the ethnic Tibet:

“1982-1984: Member of the Secretariat of the Central Committee of the Communist Youth League of China, and Chairman of the All-China Youth Federation.

1984-1985: First secretary, Secretariat of the Central Committee of the Communist Youth League of China.

1985-1988: Secretary of the Guizhou Provincial Party Committee, and first secretary of the Party Committee of Guizhou Provincial Military Command.

1988-1992: Secretary of the Party Committee of Tibet Autonomous Region, and first secretary of the Party Committee of Tibet Military Command.”

(“… Hu Jintao”, China.org.cn)

As the Chinese leader, Hu Jintao cared about the welfare of the ordinary people, and tried to carry out policies aimed at bridging the growing economic gap between the rich and the poor, championing the slogan of “putting people first”:

“The Hu era — which ends at the 18th party congress starting Nov. 8, as Hu begins the process of officially yielding power to Vice President Xi Jinping — started out with a different vision for the country. From as early as the summer of 2004, apparatchiks began to speak of “putting people first” and creating a harmonious society — in other words, addressing China’s yawning inequalities and imbalances in ways that differed from the Jiang Zemin era. Jiang, a relative liberalizer, had successfully encouraged businesspeople to join the party in 2001. The question facing Hu when he came into office was what to do about the huge differences between the rich and the poor across the country.”

(“Hu Jintao’s Legacy”, Kerry Brown, November 8, 2012, Foreign Policy)

It could be subtle, but Hu’s efforts to forge a path to reduce inequalities, one that would differ from the Jiang Zemin era, started in 2004 – the year Jiang passed the military leadership to him.

It would be reasonable to infer that a part of President Hu’s newfound confidence and optimism in 2004, underlay by his imminent relative independence in ruling the country, could be credited to the presence of General Xu Caihou, specially promoted to run the Central Military Commission under Hu.

But 10 years later in 2014 after the Hu era had given way to the Xi Jinping era and the retired Xu was brought down for corruption, what the anti-corruption investigators discovered was nothing short of shocking:

“Prosecutors searched Xu’s luxury home in Beijing in March and discovered stashed in the basement more than a tonne of US dollars, euros and yuan, reported Phoenix Weekly, a magazine run by broadcaster Phoenix Television.

Xu also stored countless precious gems and hundreds of kilograms of expensive jade, as well as rare antiques, the magazine said, citing a person with knowledge of the matter who is close to high levels of the military.

“Case handlers had no option but to call more than 10 military trucks before all the confiscated property piled up like mountains from this former Central Military Commission vice-chairman’s house could be taken away,” the magazine said. The report, which was carried by several mainland news outlets, added that Xu was forced to “bow his head and admit defeat” when confronted with a list of the items.”

(“Ex-army leader Xu Caihou had ‘a tonne of cash’ in basement”, November 21, 2014, South China Morning Post)

Literally “more than a tonne of” cash, including U.S. dollars and Euros, in General Xu’s home basement, and a mountain of treasures that took over 10 military trucks to fill!

One cannot help but shake one’s head in wonder: did President Hu Jintao honestly believe in 2004 that with General Xu backing him up like a military ‘protector’ with Communist political indoctrination, he would be able to achieve his “putting people first” populist goals?

Well, President Hu’s “putting People first” priority did not go far before he made the adjustment, affected by the economic crisis in the West, to focus on economic growth in his second 5-year term:

“But beginning in 2007, after the dramatic collapse of Western export markets, Chinese leaders decided to put everything back into maintaining economic growth, no matter how unevenly wealth was spread across society. …

Perhaps Hu had no choice but to make this gamble. Perhaps the only way to fend off the public’s rising expectations toward government and paper over growing imbalances between wealthy coastal regions and poorer western ones was to keep his foot on the gas.”

(Kerry Brown, November 8, 2012, Foreign Policy)

Concurrent to Hu’s second term where the focus is placed back onto economic growth was the promotion of public security minister Zhou Yongkang to the all-powerful Politburo Standing Committee to oversee the country’s law and order – a police and security tsar whose career started in technical work in the state owned oil industry before moving onto a Communist Party career, as cited earlier.

In April 2014 while Zhou was under suspicion of corruption, The New York Times conducted an investigation into Chinese corporate documents and estimated Zhou’s family to have $160 million U.S. in at least 37 companies in China, not counting real estate assets or overseas assets:

“It’s difficult to get a handle on the scale of Zhou’s alleged corruption. Back in April, a New York Times investigation estimated that Zhou’s family had amassed one billion renminbi ($160 million) in assets in “at least 37 companies scattered across a dozen provinces.” NYT cautioned that this estimate did not include real estate holdings or overseas assets.”

(“In Zhou Yongkang, Xi Bags the Ultimate ‘Tiger’”, by Shannon Tiezzi, July 29, 2014, The Diplomat)

Was the Western economic crisis the only big problem ruining President Hu Jintao’s goal of reducing inequalities? His own overseer of the nation’s law and order benefited himself but caused the state and the people “huge losses”, according to official accusations:

“In a brief statement, China’s top prosecution body said that the allegations against Mr Zhou were “extraordinarily severe”.

“The defendant Zhou Yongkang… took advantage of his posts to seek gains for others and illegally took huge property and assets from others, abused his power, causing huge losses to public property and the interests of the state and the people,” it said.”

(“China ex-security chief Zhou Yongkang charged”, April 3, 2015, BBC News)

But with powerful underlings like Xu Caihou and Zhou Yongkang, President Hu’s rule was nearly trouble-free, except for a short period of riots in Tibet, a region he had previously presided over, and – with these power leftists handling the problems – Hu appeared in full control to the outside world:

“In his decade in power, Hu has maintained rigid control over the nine members of the Politburo Standing Committee, the absolute summit of decision-making in China, which in turn maintained a strong grip on Chinese society. The disgrace of key leaders, like former Shanghai party secretary Chen Liangyu in 2006 and Chongqing party secretary Bo Xilai in March, led to no noticeable fissures or dissent. Hu has adroitly handled unpleasant surprises, like the Tibetan riots in 2008, albeit with vast influxes of central funding and security spending. (Makers of close-circuit televisions in China have grown rich under Hu; rare for a country not fighting an armed rebellion or a civil war, spending on internal policing has outpaced national defense.)”

(Kerry Brown, November 8, 2012, Foreign Policy)

But as the Hu era ended in 2012-2013, the province of Guizhou, another region Hu had presided over, has remained the poorest in China:

“Whatever the case, the country Hu presides over remains as unequal, if not more, than it was the day he ascended to the top in 2002. China may boast more than 96 dollar billionaires now, but 150 million Chinese still live in poverty. The country may have become the second richest in the world on aggregate, but per capita income hovers near 90th, similar to per capita income in Cuba and Namibia. Shanghainese enjoy a per capita income of more than $12,000 a year. Residents of Guizhou, China’s poorest province, earn a mere $2,500 a year.”

(Kerry Brown, November 8, 2012, Foreign Policy)

Now we know that there were these four power-leftist high officials under then President Hu Jintao in “every aspect of power from military to the party” in China, supervising important matters and making decisions, and also engaging in serious corruption activities to enrich themselves, their families and their circles.

But beyond that, how can they be compared to the “Gang of Four” in terms of politics, i.e., the policies they pursued and the decisions they made, that could make some of their problems the “gravest” since the “Gang of Four”?

To help gain a better understanding, I review a number of excerpts from an interview of Deng Xiaoping by Italian journalist Oriana Fallaci, in 1980 following Mao’s death in 1976, the end of the Cultural Revolution and Deng’s return to power. The interview regarded Deng’s views on Mao Zedong’s mistakes in late life, the Cultural Revolution, and Mao’s use of the “Gang of Four” in politics.

Deng said Mao’s unsound ideas were “chiefly “Left” ones”:

“Question: We Westerners find a lot of things hard to understand. The Gang of Four are blamed for all the faults. I’m told that when the Chinese talk about the Gang of Four, many of them hold up five fingers.

Answer: We must make a clear distinction between the nature of Chairman Mao’s mistakes and the crimes of Lin Biao and the Gang of Four. … Of course, Mao Zedong Thought was not created by Comrade Mao alone – other revolutionaries of the older generation played a part in forming and developing it – but primarily it embodies Comrade Mao’s thinking. Nevertheless, victory made him less prudent, so that in his later years some unsound features and unsound ideas, chiefly “Left” ones, began to emerge. …”

(“ANSWERS TO THE ITALIAN JOURNALIST ORIANA FALLACI”, by Deng Xiaoping, August 21 and 23, 1980, People.cn)

My analysis has shown that, like the “Gang of Four”, the possible “New Gang of Four” were all to the political left of the current Chinese leader Xi Jinping.

Deng said Mao’s objective for the Cultural Revolution was “to avert the restoration of capitalism”, but that Mao made an erroneous assessment to target “capitalists roaders in power in the Party”, cadres who had contributed to the revolution and had practical experience, and Mao’s political mistake was taken advantage of by the “Gang of Four”:

“Question: … And what did Chairman Mao really want with the “Cultural Revolution”?

Answer: … So far as Chairman Mao’s own hopes were concerned, he initiated the “Cultural Revolution” in order to avert the restoration of capitalism, but he had made an erroneous assessment of China’s actual situation. In the first place, the targets of the revolution were wrongly defined, which led to the effort to ferret out “capitalist roaders in power in the Party”. Blows were dealt at leading cadres at all levels who had made contributions to the revolution and had practical experience… Chairman Mao’s mistake was a political mistake, and not a small one. On the other hand, it was taken advantage of by the two counter-revolutionary cliques headed by Lin Biao and the Gang of Four, who schemed to usurp power. …”

(Deng Xiaoping, August 21 and 23, 1980, People.cn)

Any comparable motive on the part of the possible “New Gang of Four”, i.e., targeting other politicians, has yet to be made known, and would be an important factor substantiating the recent four as a ‘political gang’. So far as per the official disclosures, serious corruption and related abuse of power have been the main characteristics of the recent four.

Deng said using the “Gang of Four” was a mistake of Mao’s, but Deng acknowledged that they had their own “factional set-up”, and a “fair-sized base” particularly in the use of “ignorant young people”:

“Question: What we did not understand was: If the Gang of Four was, as you said, a minority with all the country against them, how could it happen that they were holding the whole country, including the veteran leaders? Was it because one of the four was the wife of Mao Zedong and the ties between Mao Zedong and her were so profound that no one dared to touch her?

Answer: This was one of the factors. As I’ve said, Chairman Mao made mistakes, one of which was using the Gang, letting them come to power. Also, the Gang had their own factional set-up and they built a clique of some size – particularly they made use of ignorant young people as a front, so they had a fair-sized base.”

(Deng Xiaoping, August 21 and 23, 1980, People.cn)

What links there were among the recent four remain largely unclear. But my analysis has shown that they had some appeals among the political left: Ling Jihua was a “populist” star and the top aide to former President Hu Jintao, then leader of the populist coalition; Bo Xilai’s Maoist-style political campaign in the city of Chongqing enjoyed popularity; Xu Caihou had served as the PLA’s top political officer, and one would believe that the Communist political indoctrination, disciplinary and egalitarian in emphasis, has some fit in the military; and Zhou Yongkang, perhaps the least populist-oriented of the four, rose from a career in the state oil industry, and such state industry sectors would tend to show support for the political left.

Deng also said that Mao’s wife Jiang Qing, a member of the “Gang of Four”, did evil things by “flaunting the banner of Chairman Mao”, and that Mao was “responsible” for failing to intervene effectively:

“Question: Was Mao Zedong blinded by her so that he wouldn’t see what she was doing? And was she an adventuress like the Empress Dowager Yehonala?

Answer: Jiang Qing did evil things by flaunting the banner of Chairman Mao. But Chairman Mao and Jiang Qing lived separately for years.

Question: We didn’t know that.

Answer: Jiang Qing did what she did by flaunting the banner of Chairman Mao, but he failed to intervene effectively. For this he should be held responsible. …”

(Deng Xiaoping, August 21 and 23, 1980, People.cn)

It would have only made sense for the new four, in pursuing their political agendas, to flaunt the banner of President Hu Jintao, who was not only their boss but the official leader of China and for that, one with an aura of ‘the Youth Leaguer’. But what inappropriate or even “evil” political agendas the four pursued have not been revealed.

And it is getting harder to discover the full scope and depth of the possible “New Gang of Four” as their numbers have just dwindled by one.

In March 2015 a few days after retired Major General Yang Chunchang, a member of the Chinese People’s Political Consultative Conference, told the media that former President Hu Jintao had been a “lame duck” in chairing the Central Military Commission while former CMC vice chairman Xu Caihou dictated the events, General Xu died of cancer at 71.

Writing in The Diplomat on Xu’s death, China analyst Bo Zhiyue noted that from a poor and unprivileged background Xu was able to enter the Harbin Institute of Military Engineering, “an elite university usually reserved for princelings”, by doing well in competitive entrance examinations:

“Julius Caesar isn’t the only person who should “beware the ides of March.” March 15 also spelled doomsday for Xu Caihou, the former Central Military Commission vice chairman and Politburo member who was disgraced as the highest ranking officer in the People’s Liberation Army to be brought down for corruption since 1949. On March 15, 2014, then-General Xu Caihou was placed under investigation for corruption. Exactly one year later, on March 15, 2015, he died of bladder cancer.

A professional soldier from a humble family, Xu in fact epitomized his time. A native of Liaoning, Xu was born in his home village of Xujiazhuang in Changxing Island in June 1943. His grandparents were both farmers, and his father found a job as a clerk in a grocery store in Dalian City when he was 12 years old. An outstanding student through his elementary and secondary education, Xu entered Harbin Institute of Military Engineering — an elite university usually reserved for princelings — through competitive college entrance examinations in 1963. He was one of the only two students from his high school — No. 8 High School in Dalian — to study there. Obviously, he was a star student at the time.”

(“The Rise and Fall of Xu Caihou, China’s Corrupt General”, by Bo Zhiyue, March 18, 2015, The Diplomat)

I suppose General Xu got to know quite a few princelings during his military university education and that was helpful later in his politically focused military career.

From 1999 to his retirement in 2012, Xu was in charge of screening for senior officer promotions, and made recommendations for more promotions of full generals than Deng Xiaoping, Jiang Zemin or Hu Jintao each promoted – since after the Cultural Revolution when China restored official military ranks in 1988:

“Between September 1999 and November 2012, Xu was in charge of appointments and promotions of high-ranking officers in the PLA. During that time, Xu personally screened more officers for promotion to the rank of full general than any CMC chairman — the top leader of China — since 1988.

Deng Xiaoping only promoted a batch of 17 generals in 1988. As chairman of the CMC from November 1989 to September 2004, Jiang Zemin promoted a total of 79 generals. As chairman of the CMC from September 2004 to November 2012, Hu Jintao promoted a total of 45 generals. But Xu Caihou screened and recommended 83 full generals — four more than promoted by Jiang, 38 more than Hu, and almost five times as many generals as those promoted by Deng!”

(Bo Zhiyue, March 18, 2015, The Diplomat)

That could be a profitable source of bribery income, which General Xu was accused of accepting in “extremely large” amount, according to Chinese military prosecutors:

“Xu Caihou, former vice chairman of China’s Central Military Commission (CMC), has confessed to taking bribes, said military prosecutors on Tuesday.

…

Xu was found to have taken advantage of his position to assist the promotions of others, accepting huge bribes personally and through his family, and to have sought profits for others in exchange for bribes. The amount of bribe was “extremely large”, the statement said.

…

Xu was CMC vice chairman from 2004 to 2012 and was made a general in 1999. Xu has been discharged from military service with his rank of general revoked.”

(“Xu Caihou confesses to taking bribe”, October 28, 2014, Xinhuanet)

Xu’s history as quoted earlier also included supervising “discipline inspection”, i.e., including anti-corruption, at the Central Military Commission in 2000-2002. That could make passing his screening a ‘premium’ clearance in ethical conduct.

But Xu’s death isn’t the end of the story for the Chinese military. During the March 2015 CPPCC annual session when Maj. Gen. Yang Chunchang lashed out at Xu, another CPPCC member, retired Major General Liu Jian, stated that former Central Military Commission vice chairman Guo BoXiong “should take responsibility for his son’s wrongdoing”, i.e., corruption:

“Liu Jian , another retired major general and CPPCC member, suggested that another former CMC vice-chairman, Guo Boxiong, was in trouble by saying that the 72-year-old general should take responsibility for his son’s wrongdoing. The Ministry of Defence recently announced that more than a dozen senior officers – including Guo’s son Guo Zhenggang – had been snared in the military’s graft crackdown. Both Guos have been the subject of speculation for months.”

(Cary Huang, March 10, 2015, South China Morning Post)

Recall that in 2004 General Guo Boxiong and General Cao Gangchuan were the military vice chairmen of the Central Military Commission, appointed under previous CMC Chairman, former Chinese President Jiang Zemin, when then President Hu Jintao took over chairing the CMC and General Xu Caihou was promoted to become a third CMC vice chairman.

In 2007-2008 Cao retired and the CMC returned to the normal setup of two military vice chairmen.

(“Chinese Military Leadership After the 17th Congress: Hu’s Guys or Whose Guys?”, by James Mulvenon, No, 23, China Leadership Monitor, Hoover Institution)

Now one has been directly implicated in President Xi Jinping’s anti-corruption campaign, and died of cancer, and the other is at least indirectly implicated due to corruption in his military family.

That was a lot of corruption, nearly full of it, at the highest level of the Chinese military.

Whether there was a “New Gang of Four” is politically intriguing, to be further discovered and explored, but official corruption underneath former Chinese leader Hu Jintao appears beyond just the four of them.

(To be continued in Part 2)